The Problems and Potential Solutions Related to the Emergence of Space Weapons in the 21st Century by Chanock, Alexander
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 78 | Issue 3 Article 8
2013
The Problems and Potential Solutions Related to
the Emergence of Space Weapons in the 21st
Century
Alexander Chanock
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alexander Chanock, The Problems and Potential Solutions Related to the Emergence of Space Weapons in the 21st Century, 78 J. Air L. &
Com. 691 (2013)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol78/iss3/8
THE PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS RELATED





II. HISTORY OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN SPACE.... 692
III. SPACE POLICY CHANGES .................... 694
IV. SPACE WEAPONS: DEFINITION AND USE
TODAY ................................... 695
V. PROBLEMS WITH WEAPONIZING SPACE ....... 696
VI. WHY THE UNITED STATES IS MOVING
TOWARD WEAPONIZING SPACE .............. 698
VII. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE..................... 700
VIII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS ........................ 702
A. SPACE DOMINANCE.............................. 702
B. SPACE DOVEs ................................... 704
C. A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN WEAPONIZATION
AND SPACE DovEs ................ ......... 707
IX. CONCLUSION ............................. 710
I. INTRODUCTIONA S SPACE BECOMES more accessible to humans, the ability
o control it becomes increasingly vital. Sending humans
and objects into space is no longer as difficult or dangerous as it
once was, which has resulted in humans using the capabilities of
space in myriad ways that benefit our lives on Earth. The United
States, in particular, has become dependent on space technol-
ogy-much of its civil and military infrastructure is now based in
* J.D. Candidate 2014, UCLA School of Law; Claremont McKenna College,
2011. The author would like to thank Professor Michael Small and his parents,
Lizette and Stephen Chanock.
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space.' However, due to the emergence of space weapons, this
ever-increasing dependence on space has made the United
States and many other countries more vulnerable.' As such, the
United States and the rest of the world now have to deal with
complex issues related to space weapons so that their emer-
gence does not destabilize the international system.
The United States already uses assets in space to assist with its
military operations on Earth, but now the United States is also
looking to weaponize space to protect those assets.' Proponents
of space weaponization see this development as a natural pro-
gression and imperative for the United States to maintain its
military dominance.' However, this decision comes with costs
because it potentially creates instability in the international sys-
tem. If the United States has a significant space weaponization
program, then other countries, such as China and Russia, will
likely follow suit because they will not want the United States to
gain a significant military advantage. This will set off a space
arms race similar to the nuclear arms race between the United
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, if
the United States fails to develop space weapons, it would likely
be more vulnerable to attack and its military capabilities would
be weakened. Therefore, it is vital that the United States and the
rest of the world address the issue of space weapons in a respon-
sible manner.
II. HISTORY OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN SPACE
The history of human activity in space began in 1957 when
the Soviet Union successfully launched the satellite Sputnik into
space.6 The United States feared that this launch would allow
the Soviet Union to control space and use it against American
citizens.7 This fear sparked a space race between the Soviet
I Jackson Maogoto & Steven Freeland, The Final Frontier: The Laws of Armed
Conflict and Space Warfare, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 165, 194 (2007).
2 See id.
3 See id. at 169.
4 See Michael Goldfarb, Space Supremacy, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 1, 2006, 11:00
AM), http://staging.weeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/
012/863kzilj.asp.
5 See Frank M. Walsh, Forging a Diplomatic Shield for America's Satellites: The Case
for Reevaluating the 2006 National Space Policy in Light of a Chinese Anti-Satellite Sys-
tem, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 759, 767-68 (2007).
6 See Leonardo P. Caselli, Space Demilitarization Treaties in a New Era of Manned




Union and United States, with each country trying to outdo the
other.' However, the space race between the two enemies was
peaceful-neither country weaponized space.9 This peaceful be-
ginning of space was also codified in several international trea-
ties."o The most significant of these agreements is the Outer
Space Treaty (OST), signed in 1967 by the United States and
101 other nations." The OST sought to maintain space as a
peaceful environment for all countries. 1 2 However, it should be
noted that the OST contains many ambiguous provisions, a fact
that has recently led some to call its effectiveness into ques-
tion." These deficiencies will be examined later in this article.
Despite the peaceful beginnings of space development, in re-
cent years space has become increasingly more important for
military affairs." Starting with the Persian Gulf War, the United
States has used satellites as a means to conduct clandestine oper-
ations.15 Space technologies, such as global positioning systems
(GPS), are now vital support mechanisms for the military.16 The
United States, Russia, and China have also started to develop
weapons that can be used in space." Today, the most prevalent
weapon is the anti-satellite (ASAT) missile, which is designed to
destroy satellites for strategic military purposes.'
To date, several countries have successfully tested ASAT de-
vices.1 In 2007, China shot one of its own satellites, and in 2008,
the United States did the same. 20 Another example of a space
weapon is the X-37B military spaceship.2 1 This reusable and un-
manned ship is based on Earth and carried into orbit by a
8 See id. at 643-44.
9 See id.
10 Andrew T. Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a
New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, 28 Hous. J. INT'L L. 873,
876-77 (2006).
11 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
12 See id. art. I.
13 See Park, supra note 10, at 882-86.
14 See id. at 872-73.
15 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 1, at 166-67.
16 See id. at 189-90.
17 See id. at 169-70.
18 See id. at 185-88.
19 See Peter Spiegel, U.S. Gauges Threat to Satellites, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/22/nation/na-satellite22.
20 See id.
21 Charity Trelease Ryabinkin, Let There Be Fight: It's Time to Reform the Regula-
tion of Commercial Space Travel, 69 J. AIR L. & Com. 101, 113-14 (2004).
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rocket.2 2 It then reenters the atmosphere and lands like an air-
plane.2 3 The United States is widely suspected of developing the
X-37B and other space vehicles for use as "space bombers,"24 but
this information has not been publicly confirmed.
III. SPACE POLICY CHANGES
Consistent with its development of weapons for space, the
United States has taken a number of policy steps that illustrate it
no longer views space as existing solely for peaceful means. This
is exemplified by the United States withdrawal from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001.26 At that time, President
Bush stated that the reason for the withdrawal was that the treaty
was an outdated relic of the Cold War.27 However, there is rea-
son to believe that the real reason for withdrawal was that the
United States wanted to develop specific ABM space-based
weapon systems, which were banned by the ABM Treaty.28
Recent reports from the Obama Administration provide addi-
tional evidence that the United States is shifting toward a more
militarized space policy. In the 2012 Department of Defense
Strategy Report, the Obama Administration stated that the
United States needs to invest in space technology to help pro-
tect U.S. interests.29 Also, under the White House Space Policy,
President Obama declared that "'peaceful purposes' allow[ ] for
space to be used for national and homeland security activities."o
The President further elaborated that the United States "will
employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for
all responsible parties . . . [and] deter others from interference
and attack . . . and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack
them."" At the end of the report, the President specified that








26 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 1, at 166.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., SUSTAINING U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR
21ST CENTURY DEFENSE 5 (2012).





the Secretary of Defense must "develop capabilities, plans, and
options" for space defense measures.3 2 Even though the Presi-
dent does not specify what types of space military activities
should be developed, it is apparent from the report's broad lan-
guage that the President desires to have military capabilities in
space (possibly including space weapons) to help defend Ameri-
can space interests.3
IV. SPACE WEAPONS: DEFINITION AND USE TODAY
One major obstacle to sufficiently addressing the space
weapon issue is that what constitutes a "space weapon" is not
altogether clear. One reason for this is that there is no univer-
sally agreed-upon definition.3 ' This presents several problems in
determining whether a space device is a space weapon or a tool
used to assist the military, such as a GPS tracker. It is important
to clearly distinguish space weapons from other space tools and
devices if one wants to construct an effective legal regime for
regulating the weaponization of space.
Although there is no official definition of "space weapon,"
there are several proposed definitions that could clarify the mat-
ter. The United Nations (U.N.) Institute for Disarmament Re-
search proposed that:
A space weapon is a device stationed in outer space ... or in the
[E]arth environment designed to destroy, damage or otherwise
interfere with the normal functioning of an object or being in
outer space, or a device stationed in outer space designed to de-
stroy, damage or otherwise interfere with the normal functioning
of an object or being in the [E]arth environment. Any other de-
vice with the inherent capability to be used as defined above will
be considered as a space weapon:
Importantly, this proposed definition states that a space weapon
can be stationed on Earth and have "dual-use" capabilities, as
illustrated by the final sentence.3 6 However, this dual-use prohi-
bition is likely why the proposed definition failed to garner ap-
proval from spacefaring nations. 7
32 Id. at 14.
3 See id.
34 See Park, supra note 10, at 882.
3 DAVID WEBB, PRAxis CENTRE, ON THE DEFINITION OF A SPACE WEAPON (WHEN
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Some countries have also offered their own definitions, which
could shed light on a potential definition. For example, Canada
proposed that space should continue to be usable for surveil-
lance and intelligence gathering, but that devices designed to
inflict physical harm on any other object should be banned."
These proposals show that although there is not a universal defi-
nition, there is a general consensus that a "space weapon" must
have the capability to inflict damage on another space object.
Nevertheless, what is unclear to the international community is
whether a space weapon's primary purpose is to inflict harm and
whether it must be based in space.
These definitional problems are evident when one examines
some of the prominent weapons used in space today. For exam-
ple, ballistic missile technology has the potential to be used for
ASAT weapons.3 As a result, it is unclear whether one can clas-
sify ASAT devices as space weapons because of the dual-use is-
sue. Whether the X-37B is a space weapon is also uncertain
because, although it is capable of inflicting damage on other
space objects, the ship does not stay in space. 0 As a result, the
U.S. military maintains that it is not a space weapon. 4 ' These
examples illustrate that a clear and encompassing definition for
space weapons is needed in order to effectively address the
issue.
V. PROBLEMS WITH WEAPONIZING SPACE
As evidenced by the development of the aforementioned
space weapons, there is a strong likelihood that space will be
weaponized in the near future. This raises numerous concerns
for countries and people on Earth. There are many critics who
believe that space needs to remain peaceful and free of weapons
because conflicts in space could easily affect the entire world.4 2
The main problem associated with weaponizing space is that
an arms race would likely occur, which could destabilize the in-
ternational system and make the world more vulnerable to war.
38 See id.
39 Johannes Wolff, "Peaceful Uses" of Outer Space Has Permitted Its Militarization-
Does It Also Mean Its Weaponization , in 3 U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH,
DISARMAMENT FORUM 5, 10 (2003).
40 See X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle, supra note 22.
41 John Lasker, US Space Weapon Now Circling the Globe, TowARD FREEDOM (May
27, 2010, 3:24 AM), http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/1980/1/.
42 See Rebecca Johnson, Security Without Weapons in Space: Challenges and Options,
in 1 U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, DISARMAMENT FORUM 53, 56 (2003).
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Accordingly, if the United States develops space weapons, other
countries such as China and Russia will inevitably start to de-
velop their own weapons to counteract the United States' advan-
tage in space.4 3 Since space is the ultimate high ground, other
countries will be forced to counteract the United States' advan-
tage in space or else face the consequences of a superpower with
a strategic advantage. This potential arms race will also cost
countries vast amounts of money and will put many weapons in
space, which increases the likelihood that they will be used.
Such an arms race would be expensive because launching weap-
ons into space is incredibly costly. As a cost reference point,
sending the X-37B on one mission costs roughly $100 million.4 4
Another major concern is the amount of space debris that
space weapons would produce. This problem is complex and re-
quires a separate lengthy analysis to detail all the potential
problems. However, it is vital for a discussion of space weapons
to briefly survey this topic because the production of space deb-
ris is a natural concern that arises when a country considers
utilizing space weapons. The fear is that destroying objects in
space could generate extremely dangerous debris with a long
orbital life. 45 This will in effect create "perpetual shrapnel that
poses a grave threat to all other satellites in orbit." 6 As noted by
Joel Primack, one of the premier experts on space debris, "the
weaponization of space would make the debris problem much
worse, and even one war in space could encase the entire planet
in a shell of whizzing debris that would thereafter make space
near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military
purposes." 47 An example of the disastrous effects of space debris
was seen when the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 produced "2,087
pieces of debris large enough to be routinely tracked" and "gen-
erated over 35,000 pieces of debris down to 1 centimeter in
size."48 In January 2013, one of these pieces severely damaged a
4 See Walsh, supra note 5, at 778-79.
- Jeremy Hsu, Air Force's New X-37B Space Plane Likely an Orbital Spy,
SPACE.com (May 19, 2010, 3:39 PM), http://www.space.com/8450-air-force-37b-
space-plane-orbital-spy.html.
45 Johnson, supra note 42.
46 John W. Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F. L. REV.
107, 130 (2010).
47 SeeJohnson, supra note 42, at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 T.S. KELSO, CTR. FOR SPACE STANDARDS & INNOVATION, ANALYSIS OF THE 2007
CHINESE ASAT TEST AND THE IMPACT OF ITs DEBRIS ON THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT
321 (2007).
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Russian spacecraft.49 As this collision illustrates, if one con-
trolled military test can cause harmful debris six years later, a
space war could have disastrous consequences for space assets
that could continue for years after the conflict has ended. This is
especially dangerous for the United States because its civilian
and military infrastructures rely heavily on space commons. The
United States owns 95% of the military satellites and pays two-
thirds of the expenditures for commercial space uses.5 0 Thus,
space debris could collide into many valuable U.S. assets.
VI. WHY THE UNITED STATES IS MOVING TOWARD
WEAPONIZING SPACE
As illustrated by President Obama's policy and the develop-
ment of space weapons, it is evident that the United States wants
to develop space weapons even though there are many potential
dangers. 5 ' Although this development might destabilize the in-
ternational system and start an arms race, as discussed above,
the United States has some valid reasons for taking these risks.
These reasons include the inevitability of the weaponization of
space and the vulnerability of U.S. space assets. 5 2
The inevitability theory of space weaponization stems from
the notion that the international community will develop weap-
ons for space just as it has for every other frontier. For example,
at first airplanes were not used as weapons, but as technology
progressed and the need for planes increased, airspace became
weaponized. Logically, it follows that space is no different than
airspace and thus will eventually become weaponized. This is be-
cause one of the potential benefits of weaponizing space is too
great to ignore-it would provide the weaponizing country with
a substantial tactical advantage. 3
The United States is also in a unique situation because it has
the ability to almost unilaterally decide whether space will be
weaponized.5 ' However, this advantage will not last forever, and
proponents of weaponization argue that the United States must
seize this advantage before it is too late and other countries,
4 John Didymus, Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Hits Russian Satellite, DicrrAL J.
(Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/345243.
50 Johnson, supra note 42, at 53.
51 See WHiE HOUSE, supra note 30, at 4.
52 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 1, at 383-84.
5 See Walsh, supra note 5, at 783-84.
- See id. at 781; see also Park, supra note 10, at 888-89.
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such as China, can dictate how space will be used. 5 As such,
proponents of weaponizing space believe that the United States
needs to be at the forefront of space weaponization and cannot
afford to let its military power slip away by not being prepared
for the future of warfare.5 6
The vulnerability argument focuses on the vast amount of
both civilian and military interests at stake in space. The U.S.
military relies heavily on its space capabilities to conduct war on
Earth. For example, reports indicate that the United States uses
"satellites for [95%] of reconnaissance and surveillance informa-
tion, [90%] of military communications, [and 100%] of naviga-
tion and positioning."5 7 Because of this heavy reliance, if
military satellites are not properly protected, the United States'
ability to engage in war will be severely diminished. Further-
more, the civilian infrastructure of the United States is largely
based in space. Satellites are now frequently used to support
"telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, [transporta-
tion], and essential government services," which makes these in-
dustries increasingly vulnerable to a devastating attack." These
concerns are exemplified by the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission,
which stated that the United States was vulnerable to a "Space
Pearl Harbor."5' The report makes clear that a Space Pearl Har-
bor would have devastating consequences for the United
States."o It is important to note that then-U.S. Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld commissioned this report in 2001, and
in the last twelve years, the United States has substantially in-
creased its reliance on space, exacerbating the report's con-
cerns.6 1 Consequently, proponents of weaponization argue that
it is vital for the United States to protect these space interests
before it is too late.6 2
55 Park, supra note 10, at 888-89.
56 See id.
57 Dean Cheng, Chuck Hagel Must Answer Chinese Challenge to U.S. Space Domi-
nance, HERITAGE FOUND. (an. 30, 2013, 4:15 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/
2013/01/30/chuck-hagel-must-answer-chinese-challenge-to-u-s-space-
dominance/.
58 See Park, supra note 10, at 895.
5 See DONALD H. RUMSFELD ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION To ASSESS
UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION
(2001).
60 See id. at xiii.
61 See id.
62 See id. at xv.
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VII. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE WEAPONIZATION
OF SPACE
One major issue associated with the emergence of space weap-
ons is that the international system has not set up an adequate
legal regime to address the problem. The U.N. has tried to con-
struct such a legal regime (consider the U.N. General Assem-
bly's Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space); however, the
United States has not signed any such agreement, making the
proposed measures ineffective." As a result, the only interna-
tional legal framework that specifically addresses the problem of
space weaponization is the OST.6 4 However, this treaty was
signed in 1967 and contains many ambiguous provisions that
prevent it from effectively dealing with the proliferation of space
weapons in the 21st century.6"
The OST forms the basis of space law because it deals with
many space-related international issues, including the militariza-
tion and weaponization of space. In the preamble, the OST
states that the treaty is designed to ensure that space is used for
peaceful purposes. 66 However, the treaty does not define the
term "peaceful purposes."6 7 Article IV of the OST also deals with
space weapons by banning the placement of nuclear missiles or
"any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" in space or on
any celestial bodies.68 Also, Article VII in essence restricts a state
from shooting down a satellite with a ground-based attack.
However, the OST does not specifically address all the poten-
tial uses of space weapons, which makes several key areas of the
space weaponization debate ambiguous. One major example is
how the OST remains "silent about satellites attacking ground-
based targets."70 This silence is important because there is a
"fundamental truth [in] international law .. . that if an act is not
63 Adam Quinn, The New Age of Space Law: The Outer Space Treaty and the
Weaponization of Space, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 475, 475-76 (2008).
64 See id.
65 See id. at 489.
66 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, pmbl.
67 See id.
68 See id. art. IV.
6 See id. art. VII.
70 Jameson W. Crockett, Space Warfare in the Here and Now: The Rules of Engage-
ment for U.S. Weaponized Satellites in the Current Legal Space Regime, 77 J. AIR L. &
Com. 671, 685 (2012).
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specifically prohibited, then that act is permitted."7 1 This creates
the troubling possibility that a country cannot shoot down a sat-
ellite from the ground but is permitted to use space weapons to
attack ground-based targets. The OST also mentions nothing
about dual-use space weapons.7 2 Just like satellites attacking
ground-based targets, this silence in effect permits space actors
to implement dual-use space weapons. Consequently, dual-use
weapons capabilities, such as ASAT missiles, can be used as a way
to avoid international legal constraints under the OST.
The OST also does not specifically define several key terms.
The main example is that the OST does not define "any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction" in space." This leads to
the question of whether this term applies "to weapons with de-
structive capability comparable to nuclear weapons" or to space
weapons in general.7 ' Also, the ban on nuclear weapons is am-
biguous because the OST does not explicitly define "nuclear
weapon. "7 It is unclear whether the nuclear ban applies to some
specific types of space weapons, such as lasers that are triggered
by a nuclear reaction, or hypervelocity rod bundles, which may
be used as ASAT weapons but emit low levels of radiation due to
being made of depleted uranium.7 6 Although these few ambigui-
ties are narrow, they exemplify the deficiencies of a treaty signed
in 1967 to deal with the military realities of 2013.
The OST also does not define where space begins, which
leads to questions of whether some low-orbit or high-atmos-
phere weapons can be governed by the OST.7 7 This is problem-
atic because weapons are categorized according to deployment
mode. 78 Thus, it is essential to delineate airspace from outer
space; otherwise, countries could put weapons in low orbit and
claim that the OST does not apply because they are not in
space.
All of these problems associated with the OST show that it is
inadequate to properly deal with the proliferation of space
71 See FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, Army Space Reference Text, ch. 3, http://www.fas.
org/spp/military/docops/army/ref text/chap3im.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2013).
72 See Quinn, supra note 63, at 494.
7 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. IV.
74 See Crockett, supra note 70, at 685.
75 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. IV.
6 See Crockett, supra note 70, at 687.




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
weapons. The treaty has too many holes and not enough teeth
to police a space arms race among the world superpowers. As a
result, it is vital that the international community amend the
treaty or create an entirely new one that is properly constructed
to handle the emergence of space weapons in a realistic and
efficient manner.
VIII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
There are a number of different views on how the United
States should address the issue of space weapons. On one end of
the spectrum is the view that the United States should abstain
entirely from developing space weapons and help construct an
international legal regime to restrict them.so On the other end
is the notion that an international legal regime would prove fu-
tile and the United States should continue developing space
weapons in order to dominate the new frontier.8 ' There are also
proposals that fit between the two extremes, such as developing
space weapons to act as a deterrent or constructing an interna-
tional legal system that allows weaponization but limits it in ways
that would avoid an all-out arms race. 2 Each idea set forth has
both merits and problems, which will be examined below.
A. SPACE DOMINANCE
There is a view among many U.S. officials and politicians that
instead of adhering to a restrictive international legal regime
that would prevent the United States from ascertaining a sub-
stantial military advantage in space, the United States should
proceed with developing space weapons and dominate the up-
coming space race without international oversight." If the
United States is able to dominate the space weaponization race,
it will only further cement its military superiority over the rest of
the world.84 The thinking follows that if the United States is a
dominant player in the space race, then it could potentially
solve the inevitability and vulnerability problems associated with
space weaponization.8 6 By controlling space, the United States
would remain at the forefront of the inevitable weaponization of
80 SeeJohnson, supra note 42, at 55.
81 See id.
82 See BRUCE W. MACDONALD, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SPEC. REP. No.
38, CHINA, SPACE WEAPONS, AND U.S. SECURITY 19 (2008).
83 SeeJohnson, supra note 42, at 54.




space. As for the vulnerability problem, no country will attempt
a "Pearl Harbor"-type attack on U.S. interests in space because
the United States would have obtained an unassailable military
and commercial dominance."
Although dominating space might seem like an advantageous
idea for the United States, there are many problems with this
thinking. First, it is highly unlikely that the United States will be
able to dominate space." Considering the economic rise of
China and its aspirations for a stronger military, it is highly
doubtful that the Chinese would allow the United States to con-
trol space. 88 China would likely see such a policy as highly pro-
vocative and would use its vast resources to compete with the
United States in a space arms race.89 This would only realize the
fears of a space arms race and would likely force the United
States to allocate much more money to the development of
space weapons."o This would, in turn, compromise the United
States' ability to pursue other military and nonmilitary priorities,
especially considering that the United States is trying to reduce
its deficit and budget in the wake of the Great Recession."
Therefore, the benefits of having a dominant space weapons
program will probably not outweigh the economic costs.
China and Russia also cannot afford to allow the United States
to dominate space because the United States could presumably
take out their nuclear capabilities via space weapons, conse-
quently eradicating the deterrent effects of China and Russia's
nuclear programs.9 2 This would allow the United States to inter-
vene in China and Russia's regional affairs more easily, without
fearing the threat of nuclear weapons.9 3 Therefore, an Ameri-
can monopoly on space weapons could lead these two countries
to counteract in other more dangerous ways. Russia could po-
tentially refuse to limit its nuclear deterrence, while China could
86 See id.
87 See MACDONALD, supra note 82, at 1, 23.
88 See id.
89 Theresa Hitchens, Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Re-
garding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization, in 1 U.N. INST. FOR DISARMA-
MENT RESEARCH, DISARMAMENT FORUM 23 (2003).
90 See MACDONALD, supra note 82.
91 See id.
92 Hui Zhang, Action/Reaction: U.S. Space Weaponization and China, ARMS CON-
TROL Ass'N (Dec. 2005), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/DEC-CVR.
9s See id.
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build more nuclear weapons, thus impeding the efforts to re-
duce the number of nuclear weapons in the world.
Another significant problem is that even if the United States
could dominate space, this dominance would create new
threats. According to Rebecca Johnson, in space, "the United
States needs to be more aware that its actions could be self-fulfil-
ling, and may well provoke asymmetric security responses in
others that create greater international threats and vulnerabili-
ties."" U.S. space dominance would cause countries that nor-
mally have "no political desire or intention to threaten the
United States" to develop their own countermeasures because of
the imbalance that space dominance would bring.16 Therefore,
because of the high likelihood of an accelerated space race and
the rise of new asymmetric threats, it is clear that attempting to
dominate space will likely cause more problems than it solves.
B. SPACE DovEs
On the other end of the spectrum is the idea that the United
States should not develop space weapons but should instead
find ways to restrict all space weapons.97 Proponents of this
course of action, often called "space doves," argue that the per-
ceived threats relating to space weaponization are overblown
and that there are other more practical and peaceful ways to
protect the U.S. interests in space and simultaneously protect
space commons from the dangers of space warfare."
One major argument that space doves make is that space war-
fare is impractical and there are other more efficient means of
addressing the vulnerability issue.99 Instead of trying to use the
military to protect satellites, the United States should find ways
to make satellites less susceptible to attack.100 One way of achiev-
ing this goal is to develop defensive mechanisms for satellites.0 '
For example, the United States could develop maneuvering ca-
pabilities for satellites so that they could potentially dodge in-
94 See id.
95 SeeJohnson, supra note 42, at 55.
96 See id.
97 U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, OUTER SPACE AND GLOBAL SECURITY
36 (2003).
98 See Park, supra note 10, at 896-97.
-9 See FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, UNITED STATES SPACE SYSTEMS: VULNERABILITIES






coming missiles.' 2 They could also harden satellites, which
would entail adding an armor-like layer to satellites to protect
them from nuclear radiation, which normally renders satellites
ineffective.1 0 3 The cost of this latter improvement is not great; it
is estimated that it would only cost 2% to 3% more than the
original price for low-orbit satellites. 04
Another way for the United States to protect space assets with-
out the use of space weapons is to develop a backup plan in case
satellites are attacked.1 05 This would allow the United States to
retain its military and civil capabilities that rely on space tech-
nology. One means of achieving this is to develop the ability to
rapidly replace or bypass damaged satellites.1o' The United
States could also compensate for lost satellite functions by using
regional backup systems that are not based in space.' 0 7 This
would make it more difficult for an enemy to mount an effective
ASAT attack because achieving the desired objective of dis-
rupting the U.S. space infrastructure would require the enemy
to hit multiple satellites simultaneously. 0 8
Space doves also advocate that the United States could use its
international influence to create a legal regime to effectively
stop the production of space weapons. Space dove Nina Tan-
nenwald argues that the United States should use its power and
position to create an "operational regime for space based on the
rule of law."1 09 She adds that the rest of the world is not rushing
to weaponize space and instead is ready to follow the United
States' "lead in devising new rules for its effective manage-
ment.""10 Tannenwald argues that the United States occupies a
unique position-it can and should use its hegemonic status to
influence the rest of the world to come to an agreement on the
prohibition of space weapons."' Another space dove, Major
John Bellflower, furthers this argument by contending that the
United States should adopt the concept of "lawfare," whereby
102 See id.
1o3 See id.
104 See id. at 28.
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law is used "as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve military objectives.""'2 One specific example of lawfare is
to constrain an adversary's military options by binding them to a
rule of law.' Bellflower argues that this tactic of lawfare can
prevent the proliferation of space weapons if the United States
spearheads the effort."' Binding countries such as China and
Russia to an all-encompassing prohibition against space weap-
ons will effectively address international concerns and simulta-
neously mitigate the danger to U.S. space assets."'
Although space doves have many valid arguments for reduc-
ing the danger of space weaponization, in reality, it is unlikely
that their ideas will prevail. One problem with a complete ban
on space weaponization is that it invokes the problems of the
prisoners' dilemma.116 If the United States decides to stop pro-
duction of space weapons and the other superpowers, such as
China and Russia, do the same, then all of the parties win. How-
ever, if a country like China or Russia decides to violate a prohi-
bition agreement by developing weapons, it could potentially
have a significant head start in the space weapons race, which
would weaken the United States' military ability. Whether such a
scenario will occur is difficult to predict, but the principles of
the prisoners' dilemma indicate that there remains a strong pos-
sibility that the parties will secretly develop the weapons to gain
an advantage. The incentive to "defect" will always remain,
which makes a long-term solution addressing space weaponiza-
tion almost impossible to achieve, even if the United States
spearheads the effort."' Thus, there is a strong argument
against space doves that the most rational choice is to develop
space weapons to ensure that the United States gets placed in an
advantageous position in the prisoners' dilemma.
Moreover, improving defensive capabilities for satellites is not
a sufficient long-term solution for solving the vulnerability prob-
lem. Inevitably, as technology advances, enemies will figure out
means to bypass the new defensive measures. It is also costly and
difficult to continually add new defensive measures to satellites
in order to keep them current with technological advances.1 1 8
112 See Bellflower, supra note 46, at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113 See id. at 114.
114 See id. at 130.
115 See id. at 144.
116 See Quinn, supra note 63, at 494; see also Walsh, supra note 5, at 783-85.
117 See Quinn, supra note 63, at 494.
118 See Walsh, supra note 5, at 762-63.
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Thus, the vulnerability problem is not sufficiently addressed by
space doves' proposal to improve satellite defenses as an alterna-
tive to the development of space weapons.
From a practical standpoint, it is highly unlikely that a legal
regime that bans space weaponization will come into effect; as a
result, a successful solution will need to recognize this reality.
The U.S. Congress has consistently rejected any bill that tries to
ban the use of space weapons. For example, both H.R. 2977 and
H.R. 2420 sought to ban space weapons but failed."' When H.R.
2977 was introduced in 2001 by Representative Kucinich, it did
not garner a single co-sponsor. 1 20 H.R. 2420, which was intro-
duced in 2005, garnered only slightly more support in Congress
but still failed to reach the floor, gaining only thirty-five co-spon-
sors.1 2 ' Although there are likely other political reasons why
these bills failed, these two examples illustrate the lack of atten-
tion that U.S. politicians have given to banning space weapons.
On the international level, there has also been little political
support from the United States for a prohibition.12 2 The U.S.
policy for the past twenty years has been to resist all U.N. at-
tempts to prohibit space weapons.' 2 3 According to Wortzel, the
chairman of the United States-China Economic Security Review
Commission, an internationally negotiated prohibition of space
weapons is also unlikely to succeed because verifying compli-
ance is very difficult to achieve.124 As such, it is important that
arguments addressing the issue of space weaponization are
grounded in the political realities of the domestic and interna-
tional system.
C. A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN WEAPONIZATION AND
SPACE DovEs
In the middle of the spectrum is the idea that the United
States should develop space weapons but use them as means of
deterrence or develop a legal regime to limit their use, or both.
This approach seeks to take many of the ideas put forward by
space doves but ground them in the political and military reali-
ties of the international system.
119 See Space Preservation Act of 2001, H.R. 2977, 107th Cong. (2001); Space
Preservation Act of 2005, H.R. 2420, 109th Cong. (2005).
120 See H.R. 2977.
121 See H.R. 2420.
122 See Quinn, supra note 63, at 475-76.
123 See id.
124 See Goldfarb, supra note 4.
7072013]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
A deterrence strategy is one way the United States can try to
limit the use of space weapons but still acknowledge that they
exist. This idea is illustrated by Bruce MacDonald, who states
that the United States should consent to space weaponization by
other countries but develop a strong space military program
that can attack enemy satellites quickly.12 However, MacDonald
argues that the United States should only use these weapons as a
last resort.'2 6 This deterrence strategy will become even more
effective as other superpowers start increasing their dependence
on space infrastructure because the risk of an escalation in space
will have increasingly devastating effects for all countries in-
volved.12 ' Furthermore, to establish an adequate deterrence
strategy, the United States should try to use space weapons that
have reversible effects. For example, the United States could use
ajammer that disrupts a satellite-to-ground station link but does
not damage the satellite.128 This type of weapon would allow the
United States to respond sufficiently to an attack but in a less
dangerous way, thereby reducing the likelihood of destabilizing
the international system.' 29 Additionally, this type of weapon
would reduce the debris problem associated with space
weaponization.so
In addition to establishing a deterrence strategy, the United
States can try to limit space weapon use through a legal re-
gime.'" James Moltz, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate
School, argues that such a legal regime should include a ban on:
the use, testing, or deployment of weapons or interceptors, of
any sort, above five hundred miles; a ban on stationing weapons,
of any sort, in low-Earth orbit; a ban on the testing or use of
lasers from ground, sea, or air-based orbital objects; and a ban on
testing or use of other ground, sea, or air-based weapons against
satellites or space-based objects.'12
Like Nina Tannenwald's proposal, to achieve Moltz's goal, the
United States would use its hegemonic status to spearhead an
international effort to either amend the OST or construct an
entirely new international treaty that is more adept at address-
125 See MAcDONALD, supra note 82, at 19.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 22.
128 See id. at 16.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 21.
131 See Park, supra note 10, at 874-75.
132 Id. at 903.
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ing the issues of space weapons in the 21st century. Along with
Moltz's proposals, this new or amended treaty should also unam-
biguously define what constitutes a space weapon and explicitly
set out the difference between space and airspace. A new defini-
tion for space weapons similar to that proposed by the U.N. In-
stitute for Disarmament Research would encompass dual-use
technologies and any weapons that can cause damage to space
assets. Such a definition would prevent countries from finding
loopholes in a vague standard. Making the legal framework
clear would help ensure that the limitations on space weapons
are effective. This strategy is also politically practical because it
could garner support from moderates in the Pentagon who disa-
gree with the proponents of space domination, and it has great
potential to receive bipartisan consensus in Congress. At the in-
ternational level, it offers Russia and China a means to limit
their use of space weapons as well. 13 3 Since the weaponization of
space seems almost inevitable at this point, this proposal is a
smart solution because it limits space weapon growth in a way
that is grounded in the reality of domestic and international
politics.
This middle ground solution of deterrence and the establish-
ment of a new legal framework that limits the use of space weap-
ons is not without its problems. The same problems associated
with verifying compliance that Wortzel discussed are still pre-
sent.1 3 1 Just like many other issues in international law, it is not
always easy to enforce new restrictions, and this becomes espe-
cially true when one recognizes the substantial advantages of de-
veloping a superior space weapons program. Also, a deterrence
strategy contains many risks. One potential problem is that un-
like deterrence in the nuclear weapons context, a deterrence
strategy for space weapons might not adequately prevent at-
tacks.61 3 For nuclear weapons, the threshold between tactical
and strategic uses has diminished because using nuclear weap-
ons has such drastic consequences. 13 However, "[w]ith space
weapons, their limited use in purely tactical situations .. . would
be less likely to lead to escalation than tactical nuclear use."137
As such, it is much more likely that a country will use a space
weapon than a nuclear weapon, even with knowledge that its
133 See id.
134 See Goldfarb, supra note 4.
135 See MACDONALD, sup-a note 82, at 33.
136 See id. at 19.
137 See id.
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enemy can retaliate. In addition to this concern, a deterrence
strategy still has substantial risks because it is not altogether cer-
tain that such a policy will effectively halt escalation. In military
conflicts, events rarely proceed as planned; consequently, there
is always the possibility that retaliation will result in a larger esca-
lation that jeopardizes the space commons and Earth. 1 3 How-
ever, despite these issues, the problems of a middle ground
solution are still less dangerous and destabilizing than the alter-
natives because they are grounded in the realities of the interna-
tional system.
IX. CONCLUSION
The potential proliferation of space weapons is a key issue
that the United States must grapple with in the 21st century.
Since it is almost inevitable that countries will begin to develop
space weapons, the international system needs to find a way to
ensure that the proliferation of these new weapons does not
destabilize the system. Right now, the United States is in the
unique position where it can significantly influence how the in-
ternational system will respond to the rise of space weapons. As
a result, it is vital that the United States help construct a new
legal regime and develop an effective deterrence strategy. This
new legal regime must both modernize and clarify the ambigui-
ties that plague the OST to ensure that the new legal system is
effective at limiting the use of space weapons. Although the fu-
ture of space weapons is uncertain, if the United States acts
responsibly in its effort to limit the inevitable rise of space weap-
ons, the world will become much safer.
138 See id. at 20.
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